Shareable intelligence

Libya

4 objects, each built so its context cannot be cropped away. Every one states the scenario range rather than a single value, carries the confidence level and the date the evidence was last checked, and links back to the full page it came from.

Copy a card's link to share it. Screenshot one and the qualifications come with it, because they are inside the frame rather than under it.

Country outlook · Northern Africa

Libya

Three scenarios, two horizons. The range is the finding — a single number would imply knowledge nobody has.

Measure	Latest observed	2031	2036
Output per person	$6,449 2025	$4,449 – $10,815	$3,265 – $16,641
Electricity access	77% 2024	78% – 79%	79% – 81%
Internet use	82% 2024	90% – 95%	93% – 97%

Growth bands: -6% · 1.64% · 9% a year per person, from Libya's own 15-year record (2011–2025) — mean ± 0.85 standard deviations, clamped to its own 5th–95th percentile. Not an outside estimate of what this country might do.

Who this outlook leaves out

Educated young people whose qualifications do not convert into work
Everyone dependent on public salaries and services when prices fall
Households already spending most of their income on food

2031 versus 2036 · Libya

Two horizons, asked the same question

By 2031

Internet use moves from 82% of the population (2024) to between 90% and 95% by 2031, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 93% — a rise of 10.8 percentage points.
In people rather than percentages: about 573,776 would still be without it in 2031 under continuation — 772,158 fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
Output per person spans $4,449 to $10,815 by 2031. The $6,366 between them is wider than half today's $6,449.
That spread is the distance between scenarios, not a margin of error — and it is a national average, which does not identify whose income moved.
The population reaches about 8 million — roughly 510,554 more people than in 2025, about 5.5 million of them of working age.
This figure is the same in all three scenarios. Most of the people who will be alive in 2031 have already been born.

By 2036

Household electricity access moves from 77.4% of the population (2024) to between 79% and 81% by 2036, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 80% — a rise of 2.1 percentage points.
In people rather than percentages: about 1.7 million would still be without it in 2036 under continuation — 27,651 more than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
Internet use moves from 82% of the population (2024) to between 93% and 97% by 2036, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 96% — a rise of 13.7 percentage points.
In people rather than percentages: about 359,372 would still be without it in 2036 under continuation — 986,562 fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
Output per person spans $3,265 to $16,641 by 2036. The $13,376 between them is wider than half today's $6,449.
That spread is the distance between scenarios, not a margin of error — and it is a national average, which does not identify whose income moved.
The population reaches about 8.4 million — roughly 898,931 more people than in 2025, about 5.8 million of them of working age.
This figure is the same in all three scenarios. Most of the people who will be alive in 2036 have already been born.

What has to happen first

For the Acceleration band to describe the decade, growth per person has to hold near 9% a year. This country has reached that rate before — its best year in the window was 89.4% — but has not sustained it across the 15-year record the band is drawn from.

What the growth model cannot see · Libya

Political instability & conflict

Binding constraint — This, not the growth model, is the operative question.

Political stability scored -1.9 in 2024, in the lowest band of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, with 85,000 people internally displaced (2025). The distance between scenarios here is set by whether the security situation holds, not by economic policy. The modelled band, drawn from recent economic history, does not describe what further deterioration would mean.

Why the band cannot contain it

Conflict does not appear in a trailing growth average until after it has already happened. A country at peace for fifteen years has no war in its variance.

What would invalidate the modelled band

Onset or escalation of armed conflict. The modelled band is drawn from economic history and contains no war; if this occurs, disregard the quantitative path entirely.

Assessed in words and deliberately not converted into a probability. This platform does not publish likelihoods it cannot derive from evidence.

AI evidence state · Libya

5 of 20 dimensions rest on a document or a measurement

4 dimensions have not been examined at all — which is a statement about this platform's research, not about Libya. There is no readiness score here: ranking countries by a weighted sum of twenty evidence states would manufacture a number nobody measured.

3 Measured A published measurement exists for this country and has been read.

2 Documented A policy, law, contract or programme document exists. No measurement of its effect has been found.

4 Inferred Assessed from adjacent indicators. Nothing AI-specific was found for this country; the reading is circumstantial.

7 Not evident Searched, and nothing was found. Informative — but the absence of a published record is not proof that nothing exists.

4 Unexamined This platform has not looked. This is a statement about the research, not about the country.

Full brief for Libya · Open in the atlas · Method · How to read the labels