Egypt

Scenarios and horizons

What could materially change by 2031 and 2036?

Scenarios are arithmetic on observed history under a published assumption. They are not predictions and carry no probability. 2026, 2031, 2036 are the only formal horizons — no value is projected for any year between them.

Youth labour-market entry

How many young people may enter working age, and what does entering the labour market look like?

• Operational

  Egyptian real GDP growth reached 5.3% in the first half of FY26 against 3.9% a year earlier, with full-year FY26 growth projected at 4.3%; employment stood at 43.8% and labour-force participation at 46.7% in Q2 FY26, both below historical averages, and the national poverty rate was 33.5% in 2021/22.

  What this does not establish. The 4.3% figure is a projection and is labelled as one; the rest are outturns. Poverty measured on the lower-middle-income line rose by about five percentage points between 2022 and 2024, so the 2021/22 national rate understates the current position. A participation rate of 46.7% is the share of the working-age population in the labour force, not an employment rate.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

What kinds of work dominate

Where do people actually work, and how might that change?

Female participation rate — Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate). Percentage of the FEMALE population aged 15 and over who are in the labour force, employed or unemployed.

• Operational

  Egyptian real GDP growth reached 5.3% in the first half of FY26 against 3.9% a year earlier, with full-year FY26 growth projected at 4.3%; employment stood at 43.8% and labour-force participation at 46.7% in Q2 FY26, both below historical averages, and the national poverty rate was 33.5% in 2021/22.

  What this does not establish. The 4.3% figure is a projection and is labelled as one; the rest are outturns. Poverty measured on the lower-middle-income line rose by about five percentage points between 2022 and 2024, so the 2021/22 national rate understates the current position. A participation rate of 46.7% is the share of the working-age population in the labour force, not an employment rate.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

Infrastructure constraints

What are the physical limits — connection, power, and where they reach?

• Operational

  Egypt is one of five countries holding effectively all of Africa's data centre capacity.

  Africa holds just 0.6% of global data centre capacity as $60bn AI drive spurs 1.2GW expansion by 2030 TechEconomy, 2026 · Secondary

Education and practical AI skills

What is the education base, and what is being built on top of it?

• Approved

  Egypt is identified among African states that have developed and begun implementing a national AI strategy.

  Strengthening AI governance in Africa OECD, 2026-04 · Primary

• Approved

  Egypt’s second National Artificial Intelligence Strategy covers 2025 to 2030, is led by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and overseen by a National Council for Artificial Intelligence, and sets targets of an ICT contribution to GDP of 7.7%, 30,000 AI experts, more than 250 startups and at least 36% of the population using AI-powered tools in daily life.

  What this does not establish. Every figure here is a target for 2030, not an achievement. The strategy states it is measured through 89 indicators, but no progress against any of them is established by this record. The ministry’s own strategy document was located but exceeded the size this platform can retrieve, so the targets are recorded from the OECD’s official register rather than quoted from the primary text.

  Egypt National Artificial Intelligence Strategy OECD.AI Policy Observatory, 2025 · Official

Informal enterprise and MSMEs

How may informal enterprises and small firms be affected, and what would let one grow?

Account ownership (incl. mobile money) — Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider (% of population ages 15+). Percentage of the population aged 15 and over. Counts an account at a bank or other financial institution, OR personal use of a mobile-money service in the past 12 months. Mobile money IS included.

• Partially operational

  Egypt’s Catalyzing Entrepreneurship project supported more than 200,000 beneficiaries, of whom 40% were women and 40% youth, and the Inclusive Housing Finance Program reports 52% of beneficiaries below the age of 40 and 18% below 30.

  What this does not establish. Beneficiary counts are reach, not outcome: nothing here establishes whether a supported enterprise survived, employed anyone, or grew. The disaggregation by sex and age is unusually specific for this record and is the reason the item is held.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

Financial inclusion

Who can be paid, save or borrow — and on what definition?

Account ownership (incl. mobile money) — Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider (% of population ages 15+). Percentage of the population aged 15 and over. Counts an account at a bank or other financial institution, OR personal use of a mobile-money service in the past 12 months. Mobile money IS included.

No reviewed document in this platform's research record bears on this question for this country. That is a gap in the evidence, not a finding about the country.

Digital public services

What can a citizen do with the state without queueing?

Account ownership (incl. mobile money) — Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider (% of population ages 15+). Percentage of the population aged 15 and over. Counts an account at a bank or other financial institution, OR personal use of a mobile-money service in the past 12 months. Mobile money IS included.

No reviewed document in this platform's research record bears on this question for this country. That is a gap in the evidence, not a finding about the country.

Agriculture and creative enterprise

Two sectors that employ many and are measured badly. What is known?

No reviewed document in this platform's research record bears on this question for this country. That is a gap in the evidence, not a finding about the country.

Local innovation, compute and technology ownership

Is capability being built here, or rented from elsewhere?

• Approved

  Egypt is identified among African states that have developed and begun implementing a national AI strategy.

  Strengthening AI governance in Africa OECD, 2026-04 · Primary

• Operational

  Egypt is one of five countries holding effectively all of Africa's data centre capacity.

  Africa holds just 0.6% of global data centre capacity as $60bn AI drive spurs 1.2GW expansion by 2030 TechEconomy, 2026 · Secondary

• Approved

  Egypt’s second National Artificial Intelligence Strategy covers 2025 to 2030, is led by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and overseen by a National Council for Artificial Intelligence, and sets targets of an ICT contribution to GDP of 7.7%, 30,000 AI experts, more than 250 startups and at least 36% of the population using AI-powered tools in daily life.

  What this does not establish. Every figure here is a target for 2030, not an achievement. The strategy states it is measured through 89 indicators, but no progress against any of them is established by this record. The ministry’s own strategy document was located but exceeded the size this platform can retrieve, so the targets are recorded from the OECD’s official register rather than quoted from the primary text.

  Egypt National Artificial Intelligence Strategy OECD.AI Policy Observatory, 2025 · Official

Regional inequality

Does the national figure describe the country, or its capital?

• Operational

  Egyptian real GDP growth reached 5.3% in the first half of FY26 against 3.9% a year earlier, with full-year FY26 growth projected at 4.3%; employment stood at 43.8% and labour-force participation at 46.7% in Q2 FY26, both below historical averages, and the national poverty rate was 33.5% in 2021/22.

  What this does not establish. The 4.3% figure is a projection and is labelled as one; the rest are outturns. Poverty measured on the lower-middle-income line rose by about five percentage points between 2022 and 2024, so the 2021/22 national rate understates the current position. A participation rate of 46.7% is the share of the working-age population in the labour force, not an employment rate.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

Gender and rural exclusion

Who is left out of the measured gains, and is it measured at all?

Female participation rate — Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate). Percentage of the FEMALE population aged 15 and over who are in the labour force, employed or unemployed.

No reviewed document in this platform's research record bears on this question for this country. That is a gap in the evidence, not a finding about the country.

Institutional implementation capability

Can the state actually deliver what it commits to — fiscally, administratively, and through a political cycle?

• Operational

  Egyptian real GDP growth reached 5.3% in the first half of FY26 against 3.9% a year earlier, with full-year FY26 growth projected at 4.3%; employment stood at 43.8% and labour-force participation at 46.7% in Q2 FY26, both below historical averages, and the national poverty rate was 33.5% in 2021/22.

  What this does not establish. The 4.3% figure is a projection and is labelled as one; the rest are outturns. Poverty measured on the lower-middle-income line rose by about five percentage points between 2022 and 2024, so the 2021/22 national rate understates the current position. A participation rate of 46.7% is the share of the working-age population in the labour force, not an employment rate.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

• Operational

  The IMF Executive Board completed the fourth review of Egypt’s performance under a 46-month Extended Fund Facility on 10 March 2025, alongside a Resilience and Sustainability Facility; the Fund projects real GDP growth of 4.6% and consumer price inflation of 13.2% for 2026, with outstanding loans of SDR 7,209.35 million as at 31 March 2026 against a quota of SDR 2,037.1 million.

  What this does not establish. An IMF projection for 2026 published on the Fund’s own country page. It is a projection, not an outturn, and it carries no probability. Growth is not employment: nothing in this record establishes who the growth reaches, or whether it reaches the labour market at all. Projected inflation of 13.2% alongside projected growth of 4.6% is the relevant pairing for a household: an aggregate expanding while prices rise at that rate does not imply rising real incomes, and this record establishes neither.

  Egypt and the IMF International Monetary Fund, 2026 · Primary

Announced versus delivered

How much of what has been announced has actually arrived?

Based on 8 dated records. A larger number means more evidence has been reviewed, not that more has happened.

Where AI adoption is evident

What is actually recorded as happening, and at what delivery stage?

• Operational

  Egypt is one of five countries holding effectively all of Africa's data centre capacity.

  Africa holds just 0.6% of global data centre capacity as $60bn AI drive spurs 1.2GW expansion by 2030 TechEconomy, 2026 · Secondary

• Operational

  Egypt is a downstream party to the unresolved Nile flow dispute following the inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in September 2025.

  Ethiopia inaugurates GERD dam amid downstream tensions with Egypt, Sudan Al Jazeera, 2025-09-09 · Secondary

• Operational

  Egypt was among the first participants in the AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative.

  The Guided Trade Initiative: documenting and assessing the early experiences of trading under the AfCFTA UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2024 · Primary

• Operational

  Egyptian real GDP growth reached 5.3% in the first half of FY26 against 3.9% a year earlier, with full-year FY26 growth projected at 4.3%; employment stood at 43.8% and labour-force participation at 46.7% in Q2 FY26, both below historical averages, and the national poverty rate was 33.5% in 2021/22.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

• Partially operational

  Egypt’s Catalyzing Entrepreneurship project supported more than 200,000 beneficiaries, of whom 40% were women and 40% youth, and the Inclusive Housing Finance Program reports 52% of beneficiaries below the age of 40 and 18% below 30.

  Egypt — Country Overview World Bank, 2026 · Primary

• Operational

  The IMF Executive Board completed the fourth review of Egypt’s performance under a 46-month Extended Fund Facility on 10 March 2025, alongside a Resilience and Sustainability Facility; the Fund projects real GDP growth of 4.6% and consumer price inflation of 13.2% for 2026, with outstanding loans of SDR 7,209.35 million as at 31 March 2026 against a quota of SDR 2,037.1 million.

  Egypt and the IMF International Monetary Fund, 2026 · Primary

Where it is not evident

Which areas have been examined and show nothing?

These decision areas have been examined for this country — the record covers adjacent areas — and no document bearing on them was found.

• Financial inclusion
• Digital public services
• Agriculture and creative enterprise
• Gender and rural exclusion

Not evident is a statement about the reviewed record. It is not a statement that nothing is happening.

What remains unexamined

Which areas has this platform not reviewed at all? Absent evidence is not evidence of absence.

Every decision area carries at least one reviewed document.

Who may benefit

Which groups are positioned to gain, on the evidence held?

On the shared data, Egypt's working-age share was 63.5% in 2026, implying about 75.1m people of working age. 31.6% of the population were under 15 in 2025, and will be reaching working age within these horizons.

A share of the population, and the count implied by it. Working age is not employment, and entering working age is not entering the labour market. Which of these people a given intervention reaches is not established by any series this platform holds; it is a question for programme-level data.

Who may be reached last

Which groups are positioned to be reached last, or missed?

The platform can name the exclusion dimensions it measures, and only those.

Disability, internal migration status and sub-national variation are unexamined for this country. A safeguard aimed at them could not be verified here.

Plausible institutional actions

What could an institution actually do here, given the constraints on the record?

This instrument does not recommend. What it can do is state which levers its evidence base can say anything about for Egypt, and which it cannot.

Open the Decision Lab for Egypt →

What must happen for improvement

What are the gates between the current position and a better one?

2 records sit at intent — announced or approved, nothing built. Each has a delivery gate it has not yet passed.

• Approved

  Egypt is identified among African states that have developed and begun implementing a national AI strategy.

  Strengthening AI governance in Africa OECD, 2026-04 · Primary

• Approved

  Egypt’s second National Artificial Intelligence Strategy covers 2025 to 2030, is led by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and overseen by a National Council for Artificial Intelligence, and sets targets of an ICT contribution to GDP of 7.7%, 30,000 AI experts, more than 250 startups and at least 36% of the population using AI-powered tools in daily life.

  Egypt National Artificial Intelligence Strategy OECD.AI Policy Observatory, 2025 · Official

What could invalidate this

What would have to be true for this reading to be wrong?

• A delivered record proving to have been withdrawn or suspended, which would move the delivery counts and is recorded here when it happens.
• A revision to the underlying indicator series by its issuing body, which would move the baseline every scenario starts from.
• Evidence that a programme recorded as national in scope operates in only part of the country, which would change who it reaches without changing its status.

What to watch next

Which specific, checkable things would move the picture?

Specific and checkable, drawn from this country's own record rather than from a general list.

• Whether Egypt is identified among African states that have developed and begun implementing a national AI strategy.… moves past Approved.
• Whether Egypt’s second National Artificial Intelligence Strategy covers 2025 to 2030, is led by the Ministry of Commun… moves past Approved.

All signals for Egypt →

Milestone timeline

What is dated, what state is it in, and what does it not establish?

Lived experience

What does the evidence imply for a specific person, and who does it miss?

• Observed Plausible implication

  A young person entering work

  31.6% of the population was under 15 in 2025; gross secondary enrolment was 84.8% in 2024; recorded youth unemployment was 18.3% in 2025.

  Plausible implication, not measured: A cohort this size arriving against an enrolment rate below universal means the schooling a young person brings to the labour market varies widely, and a programme pitched above that level selects a minority of them.

  What would settle it. Completion rates by sex and location, and destination data six and twelve months after leaving school. Neither is held here.

  Who this misses. Young people already out of school, who are outside an enrolment measure by construction.

  Evidence used: youth, secondary, youthunemp.

• Observed Plausible implication

  An informal trader or micro-enterprise owner

  43.1% of people aged 15 and over held an account at a financial institution or personally used mobile money in 2024; domestic credit to the private sector was 25.8% of GDP in 2025; 53.1% of employment was in services in 2025.

  Plausible implication, not measured: Being payable is not being financeable. An account is a payment rail, and nothing in this platform establishes that account records are used in any lending decision.

  What would settle it. Firm-level credit surveys recording refusals and their reasons, and credit-bureau coverage figures.

  Who this misses. Unregistered traders, who are outside most support instruments by design rather than by accident.

  Evidence used: account, credit, servemp.

• Observed Plausible implication

  A farmer

  17.5% of employment was in agriculture in 2025, producing 16.6% of GDP in 2025; rural household electricity access was 100% in 2024.

  Plausible implication, not measured: Where the employment share far exceeds the output share, the productivity problem and the employment problem are the same problem. Rural power is the constraint on anything requiring storage, processing or irrigation.

  What would settle it. Yield and farm-income panels linked to adoption of a specific tool or service.

  Who this misses. Farmers without a connection at all, and anyone whose land tenure prevents investment regardless of technology.

  Evidence used: agriemp, agrigdp, electricityrural.

• Observed Plausible implication

  A teacher or learner

  Gross secondary enrolment 84.8% (2024); adult literacy 79.5% (2022); household electricity access 100% (2024).

  Plausible implication, not measured: Evening study, device charging and any screen-based material all assume power at home. Where access is short of universal, a digital learning programme reaches the connected fraction of an already-enrolled fraction.

  What would settle it. School-level electrification and connectivity audits, and learning outcomes disaggregated by both.

  Who this misses. Non-literate adults, for whom a text-based service is unavailable regardless of coverage.

  Evidence used: secondary, literacy, electricity.

• Observed Plausible implication

  A citizen using public services

  74.6% of people used the internet in 2024; 43.1% of people aged 15 and over held an account or used mobile money in 2024; the government effectiveness estimate was -0.1 in 2024.

  Plausible implication, not measured: Digitising a service moves it towards the people who can already reach it. Retaining an assisted or offline channel is what decides whether the rest keep access.

  What would settle it. Service-level uptake by channel, and the share of transactions still completed in person.

  Who this misses. People whose identity documents do not match registry records — unmeasured everywhere in this instrument.

  Evidence used: internet, account, goveff.

• Observed Plausible implication

  A rural resident

  Rural household electricity access 100% against 100% nationally (2024); basic drinking water 78.9% (2024).

  Plausible implication, not measured: The 0-point gap between the national and rural figures is the distance between a national average and this person's actual position. An intervention designed against the average is designed for somebody else.

  What would settle it. Sub-national service data. This platform holds a national and a rural figure and nothing between them.

  Who this misses. Everyone in the unserved rural remainder, whose position no series here describes individually.

  Evidence used: electricityrural, electricity, water.

Each situation is built only where the indicators it names are held for this country. Where they are not, it says so rather than substituting general prose — a situation the evidence cannot support would read as a finding. The observed line is measured; the line marked as a plausible implication is an argument, and it names what would settle it.

Evidence quality and gaps

How much has been reviewed here, how good is it, and what is ageing?

Evidence depth differs between countries and this instrument renders the difference rather than smoothing it. A thin record is a statement about what has been reviewed. It is never a statement about the country, and it is never comparable to another country as a measure of performance.